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THE AUDIT COMMITTEE: DIRECTOR LIABILITY
IN THE WAKE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT AND TELLO V. DEAN
WITTER REYNOLDS
Bryan A. McGrane*
The audit committee rose to prominence within the realm of corpo-
rate governance following the collapse of the Enron Corporation and
subsequent ratification of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents the first independent
statutory provision requiring the formation of an audit committee and
imposes a significant set of responsibilities upon audit committee mem-
bers. However, the interaction between these mandates and the histori-
cal rules of corporate and securities law have led to ambiguity
surrounding the legal standards that govern the audit committee. In an
age where the complexity of financial reporting seems to grow at an
exponential rate, audit committee members must recognize the full extent
of their responsibilities to corporate shareholders and personal exposure
to liability.
This Note examines the legal treatment of the audit committee and
its individual members under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In particular, I
attempt to identify the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the historical
rules of corporate and securities law applicable to the audit committee.
I conclude that while the Sarbane's Oxley Act has increased the
liability exposure of audit committee members, it fails to significantly
heighten the standards under which the law scrutinizes their conduct.
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INTRODUCTION
Sitting on the board of a public corporation traditionally represents
the "culmination of a successful career."1 Classic board appointments
confirm elevation to the business community's highest echelons,2 and the
status that accompanies directorship remains so coveted that monetary
compensation is often the last consideration for potential candidates.
3
Nevertheless, the accounting scandals that rocked U.S. capital markets at
the dawn of the new millennium have forced candidates to consider the
extent to which positions on boards-and various board committees-
may destroy both personal wealth and reputation. 4 Spawned in the wake
of accounting scandal, such considerations have naturally served of most
importance to potential audit committee members.
I SCOTr GREEN, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1 (2005).
2 See id.
3 See Thomas J. Neff & Robert L. Heidrick, Why Board Service Is Still Attractive,
CORP. BOARD, May/June 2006, at 3.
4 See GREEN, supra note 1, at 1.
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The collapse of the Enron Corporation (Enron) under the weight of
accounting fraud generated a surge of corporate investigation 5 that ele-
vated the audit committee to its present status as "the most important and
challenging" committee of the board.6 Following Enron's collapse and
the multitude of accounting scandals subsequently revealed, a general
hostility arose toward directors, who remain charged with overseeing the
actions of executives under the corporate model. 7 Specifically, the pub-
lic directed a significant amount of anger toward audit committee mem-
bers in light of their unique role throughout the financial reporting
process.
8
In response to the public outcry, Congress quickly passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act),9 which requires
every public corporation to form an audit committee and governs the
responsibilities of audit committee members. 10 Exacting public scrutiny
and new governing law under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have dramatically
increased the burden associated with audit committee membership." I For
example, audit committees must now meet more frequently and for
longer periods.' 2 The modern audit committee meeting also requires sig-
nificantly more preparatory work.' 3 In the past, meetings often consisted
of mere presentations by executives and internal auditors-committee
members received information and then asked questions in scripted fash-
ion.' 4 Current audit committee members, however, must typically en-
gage in extensive research and questioning prior to meetings. 15 The
modern audit committee meeting thus consists largely of discussion con-
cerning the risks associated with adopting different accounting tech-
5 See Perry E. Wallace, Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron, et al.:
Governing Outside the Box Without Stepping off the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASH-
BURN L.J. 91, 102-03 (2004).
6 SPENCER STUART, THE GLOBAL 50: PERSPECTIVE OF LEADING AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHAIRS 2 (2005).
7 See id. at 17.
8 See First Amended Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Securities Laws, at
103-05, In re Enron Co. Sec. Litig., No. H-01-3624 (filed May 14, 2003) [hereinafter Enron,
First Amended Consolidated Complaint]; First Amended Class Action Complaint of Lead
Plaintiff Alan G. Hevesi on Behalf of Purchasers and Acquirers of all WorldCom, Inc. Pub-
licly Traded Securities, at 15-26, 156, In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3288
(filed Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter WorldCom, First Amended Class Action Complaint]; discus-
sion infra Part I.B.2.
9 See infra note 87.
10 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
11 See STUART, supra note 6, at 10.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 3.
15 See id.
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niques. 16 Overall, the average time commitment associated with audit
committee membership has increased by more than 50 percent.17
In addition to the increased time commitment, potential audit com-
mittee members must also consider the specter of uncertain liability that
looms in the face of new governing law. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act raises
important questions with respect to the legal treatment of audit commit-
tee members, which the Enron and WorldCom, Inc. (WorldCom) settle-
ments only magnify. Enron directors, for example, paid approximately
$13 million in personal assets towards satisfaction of the class action
initiated after the corporation filed for bankruptcy.18 WorldCom direc-
tors paid nearly $18 million in personal assets towards satisfaction of a
similar class action. 19 Prior to these instances, state legislation authoriz-
ing corporate insurance policies20 and indemnification 21 had rarely failed
to protect the private assets of individual directors.
22
This Note examines the legal treatment of the audit committee and
its individual members under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Current and pro-
spective audit committee members must fully understand the extent to
which the law exposes both their reputations and assets. More impor-
tantly, audit committee members-given their unique role in the finan-
cial reporting process-must fundamentally appreciate all legal
obligations owed to corporate shareholders.
Part I explores the function and history of the audit committee,
while Part II examines the preemptory effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
with respect to those fiduciary duties that state law imposes upon audit
committee members. Part III considers the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on prior federal securities legislation applicable to members of the
audit committee. In particular, Part III evaluates those legal and policy
considerations surrounding the circuit split left after Tello v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, which involves the use of the extended statute of limitations
found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to revive time-barred claims of securi-
ties fraud under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).
16 See id.
17 See id. at 9.
18 See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Directors at Enron to Chip in on Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2005, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/08/business/08enron.html?-
r=-l&oref=slogin (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
19 See id.
20 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (2007); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1984).
21 See tit. 8, § 145(a)-(f); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51-8.52 (1984).
22 See Eichenwald, supra note 18.
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I. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE
A. Function of the Audit Committee
An audit is an examination of a corporation's management-gener-
ated financial statements by an independent public accounting firm.
23
The examination culminates with the production of an audit report in
which the accounting firm expresses an opinion regarding the financial
statements' accuracy. 24 While federal securities law requires all public
corporations to procure audit reports, 25 the fundamental necessity of au-
dits stems from the separation of management and ownership inherent to
the corporate model. 26 Financial statements constitute "management's
primary communication" with shareholders,27 who only possess residual
ownership rights to corporate assets. 28 Since management maintains op-
erational control, it may employ improper accounting methods to create
financial statements that distort corporate performance. Moreover, pow-
erful incentives continually tempt individual managers to adopt these im-
proper methods. Poor corporate performance may result in the dismissal
of management, and the compensation packages offered to individual
managers frequently contain incentive structures based upon a corporate
earnings target.29
To prevent financial statement distortion, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
prescribes that every public corporation must establish an audit commit-
tee. 30 An audit committee is "a committee . ..established by and
23 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2(a)(2), 116 Stat. 745, 747
(2002). Auditors must conduct examinations in accordance with any applicable Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or Public Company Accounting Board regulations. See id.
Prior to the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Board, auditors had to comply
with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. See id.
24 See id. § 2(a)(4).
25 See id.
26 See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 99 (2d ed. 2007).
27 HANDBOOK OF AccOUNTING AND AUDITING 5-3 (Robert S. Kay & D. Gerald Searfoss
eds., 2d ed. 1989).
28 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 114 ("Common stock holds ... the residual claim
on the corporation's assets and income.").
29 See id. at 328 ("[M]anagers are more likely to 'game' incentive pay schemes as the
monetary stakes increase, just as athletes are more likely to use performance-enhancing drugs
as the monetary returns for victory increase.").
30 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301(l)(a), 116 Stat. 745, 776
(2002). Section 301 further instructs the SEC to adopt rules requiring all national securities
exchanges to prohibit the listing of any corporation that fails to comply with the audit commit-
tee requirement. See id.; Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities
Act Release No. 8,220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,001, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 9, 2003) (setting forth SEC Rule 10A-3, which requires
national securities exchanges to comply with Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and pro-
vides further requirements with respect to director independence); NYSE, Inc., Listed Com-
pany Manual § 303A (2003) (requiring listed companies to comply with SEC Rule 10A-3 and
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amongst the board of directors of [a corporation] for the purpose of over-
seeing the accounting and financial reporting process[ ] . . and audits of
the financial statements."' 31 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
prescribes that each member of the audit committee must hold a seat on
the board of directors and "otherwise be independent" of the corpora-
tion. 32 As a result, audit committee members may not-other than in
their capacity as directors-accept any compensatory payments from the
corporation or be otherwise affiliated with the corporation or its subsidi-
aries.33 Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further directs the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt rules requiring public
corporations "to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons there-
for[e], the audit committee . . . is comprised of at least [one] member
who is a financial expert."' 34 This provision has the practical effect of
requiring all public corporations to maintain at least one financial expert
on their audit committee. 35 The audit committee is "directly responsible
for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any
registered public accounting firm employed" during the course of an au-
dit. 36 Since management may attempt to coerce an auditor into approv-
ing improper accounting methods, the audit committee must resolve any
"disagreements between management and the auditor regarding financial
reporting [techniques]." 37 Furthermore, Section 301 requires the audit
committee to create an adequate reporting system with respect to internal
accounting and the audit process. 38 The reporting system must ensure
that all complaints directed to the corporation regarding "accounting, in-
ternal accounting controls, or auditing matters" are adequately ad-
dressed. 39 The reporting system must also permit corporate employees
to anonymously submit any concerns pertaining to internal accounting
procedures or independent audits.40 Finally, the audit committee may at
setting forth additional requirements with respect to director independence); NASDAQ, INC.,
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, R. 4350(d) (2009), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2009) (requiring listed companies to comply with SEC Rule 10A-3 and setting
forth additional requirements with respect to director independence).
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(3).
32 Id. § 301(3)(A).
33 See id. § 301(3)(B). See supra note 30 for additional independence requirements set
forth by national securities exchanges.
34 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407(a); see also Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8,177, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,235, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,110 (2003) (defining a financial expert in the context of an audit
committee).
35 See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1175 (2004).
36 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(2).
37 Id.
38 See id. § 301(4).
39 See id. § 301(4)(A).
40 See id. § 301(4)(B).
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any time engage the services of outside advisers and legal counsel to help
ensure the fulfillment of its duties.
41
B. History of the Audit Committee
1. Twentieth Century Rise of the Audit Committee
While the origins of modem audit committees remain difficult to
determine with precision, 42 the first audit committees in the United
States appeared during the early twentieth century. 43 Early twentieth-
century statutes placed specific audit requirements on banks, insurance
companies, and similar financial institutions." Consequently, such orga-
nizations stood among the first corporations to establish audit commit-
tees.45 Delegating authority to an audit committee helped preserve board
effectiveness despite the greater responsibilities placed on individual di-
rectors and the increasing complexity of corporate financial statements.
46
Throughout most of the twentieth century, however, the legal and
accounting communities mounted only "[s]poradic efforts to define the
need for" an audit committee operating within the board of every public
corporation. 47 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and SEC ini-
tially endorsed an unrefined concept of the audit committee in response
to the 1939 investigation of McKesson & Robbins Inc., the SEC's first
significant accounting fraud inquiry. 48 Nevertheless, it was not until
1972 that the SEC first recommended every public corporation establish
an audit committee. 49 Adherence to this recommendation also remained
optional despite growing recognition of the need to more appropriately
41 See id. § 301(5).
42 See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 27, at 6-2.
43 See FRANK M. BURKE & DAN M. Guy, AUDIT COMMITTEES: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS,
MANAGEMENT, AND CONSULTANTS 9 (2d ed. 2002).
44 See id.
45 See id. For example, the Prudential Insurance Company of America first established
its audit committee nearly one hundred years ago. See id.
46 See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 27, at 6-1.
47 BURKE & GuY, supra note 43, at 19.
48 See In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2,707, [1937-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 62,104, at 62,108 (Dec. 5, 1940) ("[Many compa-
nies would benefit from the] [e]stablishment of a committee . . . selected from non[-]officer
members of the board of directors which shall make all.., nominations of auditors and shall
be charged with... arranging the details of the engagement."); see also Rocco R. VANASCO,
THE AUDIT COMMITrEE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (1994) ("[S]election of the audi-
tors by a special committee composed of directors who are not officers of the company seems
[to be an] acceptable [practice].") (quoting Report of the Subcommittee of the NYSE on Inde-
pendent Audits and Audit Procedures of the Committee on Stock List (1940)).
49 See Standing Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5,237, Exchange Act Release No. 9,548, Investment Company Act Release Act No.
7,091, 37 Fed. Reg. 6,850 (Mar. 23, 1972) ("[T]he Commission... endorses the establishment
by all publicly-held companies of audit committees composed of outside directors .... ").
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delegate board responsibilities. 50 While the NYSE required the forma-
tion of an audit committee after 1977,51 the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers and the American Stock Exchange did not adopt similar
listing requirements until the late 1980s. 52 Listing requirements, moreo-
ver, only represent private contractual terms between corporations and
the exchanges upon which their securities trade.53 The twentieth century
thus closed without codification of any independent legal authority re-
quiring the formation of an audit committee.
The twentieth century also witnessed few scholarly attempts to ar-
ticulate the specific responsibilities of an audit committee after its forma-
tion.54 Initial endorsements of the audit committee noted only that a
group of independent directors should select all public accounting firms
contracted to conduct audits. 55 It was not until 1987 that the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (commonly known as
the "Treadway Commission") suggested the first set of guidelines re-
garding audit committee duties and best practices. 56 The Treadway
Commission reasoned that the mere formation of an audit committee is
insufficient to protect shareholder interests, 57 as the committee must
thereafter remain "vigilant, informed, diligent, and probing [when] fulfil-
ling its oversight responsibilities.1
5 8
The Treadway Commission guidelines recommended that audit
committees consist of at least three independent directors who all receive
continuous training in both financial reporting and company-specific op-
erations. 59 Moreover, the Treadway Commission suggested audit com-
mittee responsibilities should include the periodic review of auditor
independence and effectiveness, the adequacy of internal accounting
50 See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 74, 1974 WL 449, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974)
(exemplifying the SEC's strategy during the 1970's of seeking securities litigation settlements
that provided for the establishment of audit committees); Notice of Amendments to Require
Increased Disclosure of Relationships Between Registrants and Their Independent Public Ac-
countants, Securities Act Release No. 5,550, Exchange Act Release No. 11,147, [1937-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 62,394, at 62,397 (Dec. 20, 1974) (requiring a
registered company to disclose in its proxy statements the names of its audit committee mem-
bers or state that no such committee existed).
51 See VANASCO, supra note 48, at 2.
52 See BURKE & Guy, supra note 43, at 28-30.
53 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1210.
54 See BURKE & Guy, supra note 43, at 19.
55 See VANASCO, supra note 48, at 2.
56 See REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON FRAUDULENT FtN. REPORTING 176 (1987),
available at http://www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf. The Treadway Commission was a
"private sector initiative" that received joint sponsorship from the American Accounting Asso-
ciation, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National
Association of Accountants. See id. at 1.
57 See id. at 41.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 182-83.
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controls, and the legitimacy of officer expense account policies. 60 The
guidelines further recommended that the audit committee meet fre-
quently, confer with auditor representatives in private, and regularly re-
port its findings to the entire board.61  Finally, the Treadway
Commission suggested the full board of directors create a written audit
committee charter explicitly setting forth all requirements and delegated
responsibilities, including those suggestions taken from the proposed
guidelines and any alternatives specific to the corporation.
62
2. Scandal in the New Millennium and Implementation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Foreshadowing the vast scandal to come, SEC chairman Arthur
Levitt made a significant speech in 1998 addressing the disclosure of
corporate earnings. 63 Chairman Levitt warned of an "erosion in the qual-
ity of ... financial reporting" 64 that stemmed from the increased pressure
placed upon corporate managers to meet Wall Street expectations.
65
Specifically, he identified several of the more popular accounting meth-
ods used to. distort corporate financial statements. 66 Chairman Levitt fur-
ther noted that a "qualified, committed, independent and tough-minded
audit committee[ ] represent[s] the most reliable guardian[ ] of the public
interest."'67 As a result, the SEC included strengthening the audit com-
mittee in its nine-part action plan to improve the reliability and trans-
parency of financial statements. 68 The plan called for each audit
60 See id.
61 See id. at 183.
62 See id. at 42-43.
63 See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the NYU Center
for Law & Business: The "Numbers Game" (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 See id. The first of the more popular techniques corporations use to distort their finan-
cial positions is the "Big Bath" restructuring charge. Id. During some form of internal restruc-
turing corporations overstate the costs and associate these expenses with depressed revenue in
hope that the market will look beyond the one-time charge. See id. Second, corporations
engage in a form of "creative acquisition accounting" that reports a portion of the acquisition
price as a one time 'in process' research and development expense. Id. Third, corporations
use unrealistic assumptions to estimate certain liabilities. See id. Fourth, corporations abuse
the accounting principle that only material items need be included in financial statements. See
id. Fifth, corporations improperly accelerate the recognition of revenues to offset poor earn-
ings. See id.
67 Id.
68 See id. The plan further called for corporations to disclose the impact of all changes in
accounting assumptions and for the accounting profession to set strict rules for the auditing of
research and development purchases, revenue recognition, and restructuring expenses. See id.
Additionally, it required corporations to consider the quality of items and not merely the quan-
tity when evaluating materiality for accounting purposes. See id. The plan also called for an
increased emphasis on corporate responsibility and the training of auditors. See id.
2009]
584 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18:575
committee member to possess a financial background and maintain no
personal ties with the corporate chairman. 69 It further called upon the
audit committee to meet frequently, employ its own outside advisers, and
ask "tough questions of management and outside auditors." 70
Despite Chairman Levitt's call for strengthened audit committees as
a means to combat the diminishing quality of financial disclosure, Enron
filed for bankruptcy in 2001 and spawned an unprecedented wave of in-
vestigation into the accounting practices of public corporations."' Enron
announced a restatement of prior financial results in November 2002 that
eliminated $1.2 billion in shareholder equity. 72 Within six weeks, subse-
quent investigations into the corporation's true financial position drove it
into bankruptcy. 73 Corporate managers had accrued over $2 billion from
personal sales of Enron stock and bonus payments tied to earnings.74 In
facilitating such personal gain, management had employed an assortment
of fraudulent accounting and auditing techniques 75 to report billions of
dollars in fictitious revenue and conceal similar quantities of debt.76
These techniques artificially inflated earnings, which resulted in in-
creased share prices. 77 The inflated value of Enron stock, however, van-
ished instantly during bankruptcy proceedings. 78 The value of publicly
held Enron debt instruments decreased significantly as well. 79 Purchas-
ers of Enron debt and equity securities lost billions of dollars in the
aggregate.80
The most notable accounting inquiry to follow in the wake of En-
ron's collapse was the WorldCom investigation. 81 Over a four year pe-
riod, WorldCom management employed a number of fraudulent
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See Wallace, supra note 5, at 102-03. Investigations began with respect to the ac-
counting practices of a vast array of well-established public corporations including: Global
Crossing, Tyco, Merrill Lynch, Adelphia Communications, Quest Communications, ImClone
Systems, Xerox, WorldCom, and AOL Time Warner. See id.
72 See Enron, First Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 8, at 51.
73 See id. at 55.
74 See id. at 15.
75 In particular, Enron managers abused mark-to-market accounting methods to improp-
erly accelerate revenue recognition. See id. at 28-29. Managers also engaged in transactions
with controlled partnerships and special purpose entities that resulted in the appearance of
greater corporate revenues and less corporate debt. See id. at 5.
76 See id. at 55.
77 See id. at 4-5.
78 See id. at 53.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 6.
81 See WorldCom, First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 8.
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accounting techniques to overstate earnings by nearly $9 billion.82 Nev-
ertheless, subsequent investigations into the corporation's true financial
position drove WorldCom to file during 2002 for the then largest bank-
ruptcy in U.S. history. 83 Investors holding WorldCom debt and equity
securities lost billions of dollars in the aggregate.
84
The wave of investigation into corporate accounting practices sig-
nificantly hastened development of independent legal authority gov-
erning audit committee formation and responsibility. Complaints filed
against the Enron and WorldCom directors for securities fraud and re-
lated claims specifically designated members of the audit committee in
highly publicized class action suits. 85 The WorldCom complaint, for ex-
ample, devoted seventeen pages to specifically detailing the way in
which "[t]he [a]udit [c]ommittee's [f]ailure to [f]ulfill its
[r]esponsibilities [a]llowed . . . [f]raud to [g]o [u]ndetected. ' '86 In re-
sponse to the subsequent public outcry, Congress quickly passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.87 Section 301 offered the first independent statu-
tory provision requiring every public corporation to establish an audit
committee. 88 More importantly, Section 301 finally set forth the specific
responsibilities of an audit committee after its formation. 89
II. AUDIT COMMITTEE LIABILITY: STATE CORPORATE LAW
A. Fiduciary Duties and the Committee Structure
1. Director Fiduciary Duties
Each member of a corporate board maintains a fiduciary relation-
ship with the corporation and must therefore act in accordance with the
fiduciary duties of obedience, care, and loyalty set forth under the appli-
cable state law. 90 The duty of obedience requires directors to "act con-
sistently with the legal documents that create [t]he[i]r authority." 91 As a
result, directors must perform any tasks the corporate charter requires of
82 See id. at 2. In particular, WorldCom managers improperly released depreciation
reserves and accruals. See id. at 35. Managers also improperly capitalized billions of dollars
in expenses. See id. at 36.
83 See id. at 4.
84 See id. at 2.
85 See Enron, First Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 8, at 103-05;
WorldCom, First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 8, at 15-26.
86 WorldCom, First Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 8, at 156.
87 Accounting Reform and Investor Protection, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) (opening statement of Paul S.
Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
88 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(2002).
89 See id.
90 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 241.
91 Id.
2009]
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them-such as holding an annual shareholder's meeting-even if they
believe diverging from the requirements set forth would benefit the
corporation.
92
The duty of care requires directors to serve the corporation "with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. '' 93 Duty of
care claims raise questions of director malpractice with respect to corpo-
rate losses generated in two contexts: (1) the execution of business deci-
sions and (2) fulfillment of the oversight function. 94 To prevent
excessive risk aversion from fear of liability, the business judgment rule
largely insulates directors from duty of care claims following the execu-
tion of a business decision. 95 The rule presumes that a valid business
judgment arises when directors are financially disinterested with respect
to a matter, become duly informed before taking any action with respect
to that matter, and then proceed in good faith on behalf of the corpora-
tion.96 Courts first ascertain whether directors were financially disinter-
ested and acting in good faith.97 Once a court determines that directors
were financially disinterested with respect to a decision and acted in
good faith, the business judgment rule will generally offer protection ab-
sent evidence of gross negligence.
98
The duty of care further requires directors to exercise reasonable
oversight with respect to corporate dealings and respond appropriately to
any concerns discovered. 99 As a result, no liability exists in the absence
of red flags which the exercise of reasonable oversight would uncover. 100
Reasonable oversight entails the creation of reporting systems that pro-
vide directors with the information necessary to monitor the corporation
and compliance programs that ensure the corporation's adherence to ap-
plicable law.' 0 1 The sophistication of any reporting system or compli-
92 See id.
93 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1994).
94 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 263-64.
95 See id. at 243, 245.
96 See AM. BAR Assoc., CORPORATE DIRECTOR'S GUIDEBOOK 26 (5th ed. 2007).
97 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 255. There is no set definition of good faith, but
bad faith generally includes "intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests of the corporation, . . . act[ing] with the intent to violate applicable positive
law, or... intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty to act." In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (footnotes omitted).
98 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) ("We think the concept of
gross negligence is . . . the proper standard for determining whether a business judgment
reached by a board of directors was an informed one.").
99 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[D]irectors
are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to
put them on suspicion that something is wrong.").
100 See id.
101 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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ance program, however, remains a matter of business judgment.10 2
Directors may freely seek to balance the resources invested in reporting
systems and compliance programs with the expected losses from poten-
tial oversight failures in a cost-effective fashion. 10 3 Thus, once a report-
ing system or compliance program exists, directors generally bear no
liability for losses sustained from any deficiencies absent evidence of
gross negligence. °4
The duty of loyalty requires directors "to exercise [their authority]
over corporate processes or property (including information) in a good-
faith effort to advance the interests of the company."'1 5 The duty of
loyalty thus prevents directors from enriching themselves to the detri-
ment of the corporation.'0 6 More specifically, duty of loyalty concerns
commonly arise in several general contexts. First, courts apply the cor-
porate waste doctrine to evaluate all charitable donations that directors
approve on behalf of a corporation. 10 7 No corporate waste-and thus no
liability under the duty of loyalty-exists provided the donation is rea-
sonable in magnitude.' 08 Second, courts also apply the corporate waste
doctrine to all management compensation awards that directors ap-
prove. 109 Corporations must receive some reasonable value in considera-
tion of a compensation package, as courts are more likely to find waste
when large compensation packages begin to look like gifts." 0 Third,
courts evaluate all self-dealing transactions under the entire fairness stan-
dard."' Since a self-dealing transaction is one in which directors main-
tain interests on both sides of the agreement,1 12 those directors facing
conflicts of interest must demonstrate that any self-dealing transaction is
entirely fair to the corporation. 1 3 Failure to disclose all material infor-
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 971.
105 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 293.
106 See id.
107 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2007) ("[Corporations maintain the authority] to
[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes,
and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof ...."); see also Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (holding that while corporations possess the statutory
authority to make charitable donations, the corporate waste doctrine dictates the magnitude of
a donation is appropriate only if reasonable).
108 See Kahn, 594 A.2d at 61.
109 See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997) (describing current
Delaware law applying the waste doctrine to option grants).
110 See id. at 336.
111 See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976) (holding that direc-
tors must demonstrate any self-dealing transaction was entirely fair to the corporation, even if
the disinterested board members approved the transaction after full disclosure of all material
information concerning conflicting interests).
112 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 642 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
113 See Fliegler, 361 A.2d at 221-22.
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mation pertinent to conflicts of interest will preclude a finding of fair-
ness. 114 Fourth, directors face liability for duty of loyalty breaches if
they usurp a corporate opportunity. 1 5 When a director pursues a busi-
ness opportunity in an individual capacity, courts employ a variety of
tests to determine if-given the director's position as a fiduciary-that
opportunity in fact belongs to the corporation.
116
2. Interplay Between Fiduciary Duties and the Committee
Structure
Unless prohibited by the charter or bylaws, a corporate board main-
tains the authority to create committees composed of one or more direc-
tors. 117 Committees may then exercise the full powers of the board to
the extent specified." 18 While the purpose of the committee structure is
to efficiently fulfill board responsibilities, 19 delegation of authority to a
committee does not relieve the remaining directors from their fiduciary
duties. ' 2 0 Thus, delegating responsibility over a matter to a committee of
the board will not relieve the remaining directors of their fiduciary duties
with respect to that matter. 121 The remaining board members are, how-
ever, safe from liability concerns when they act in good faith reliance
upon any statements or information that a committee presents. 122 Simi-
larly, committee members do not face liability when they act in good
114 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937-39 (Del. 1985) (finding
entire fairness when corporate board received full disclosure of all potential conflicts).
115 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 351.
116 See id. First, the expectancy test dictates that, at minimum, a corporation has an ex-
pectation its directors will not use their knowledge of corporate plans to pursue business op-
portunities that are harmful to it. See id. Second, the line of business test dictates that
directors may not usurp any opportunities that fall within the corporation's line of business.
See id. at 351-52. Third, the fairness test serves as a catch all test that courts often employ to
evaluate all the relevant circumstances before determining whether a director has improperly
usurped a corporate opportunity. See id. at 352.
117 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(l)-(2) (2007); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a)
(1984).
118 See tit. 8, § 141(c)(l)-(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(d) (1984). The authority to
exercise the full powers of the board is subject to certain exceptions. Committees of the board
may only authorize distributions under certain conditions. See tit. 8, § 141(c)(1); MODEL Bus.
CORP. Acr § 8.25(e)(1) (1984). Committees of the board may not adopt or propose to the
shareholders any action that requires a shareholder vote. See tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)-(2)(i); MODEL
Bus. CORP Acr § 8.25(e)(2) (1984). Committees of the board may not fill board vacancies.
See MODEL Bus. CORP Acr § 8.25(e)(3) (1984). Committees of the board may not alter the
corporate charter or bylaws. See tit. 8, § 141(c)(l)-(2)(ii); MODEL Bus. CORP ACT
§ 8.25(e)(4)-(5) (1984).
119 See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 27, at 6-1 ("Committees
are formed to fulfill, not expand, the board's responsibilities.").
120 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(f) (1984).
121 See id.
122 See tit. 8, § 141(e); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)-(b) (1984).
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faith reliance upon information from fellow committee members, other
directors, or other corporate employees.
123
B. The Intrusion of Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 301
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act "makes unprecedented federal inroads into
[traditionally state-regulated areas] of corporate governance."' 124 Provi-
sions applicable to audit committee members that conflict with state cor-
porate law thus raise important questions of federal preemption.
Several preemption issues, for example, arise in connection with the
delegation of board authority to an audit committee. First, provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act raise concern as to whether formation of an audit
committee remains an independent power of the board. State corporate
law typically provides that a board may create committees composed of
one or more directors. 125 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, how-
ever, prescribes that a public corporation must establish an audit commit-
tee. 12 6 The inherent tension in statutory language calls into question
whether Section 301 functions independently to create an audit commit-
tee within the board of every public corporation. Second, Section 301
prescribes that the audit committee must establish a reporting system
with respect to accounting concerns and "shall be directly responsible for
the appointment, compensation and oversight" of auditors. 127 Since the
audit committee maintains responsibility for both the audit process and
any additional accounting concerns, reasonable interpretations of Section
301 could conclude that it relieves the remaining directors of all fiduci-
ary responsibilities with respect to financial reporting. 28 Third, Section
301 confers responsibilities upon the audit committee as a whole.
129
Since state corporate law protects committee members who rely upon
one another in good faith, 130 Section 301 raises concern over the extent
to which individual audit committee members retain liability for actions
the committee takes in good faith reliance upon its financial expert.'
3 1
Preemption issues also arise in connection with audit committee
members' fiduciary duty of care. Section 301 explicitly confers respon-
sibilities upon the audit committee, and traditional state law principles
123 See tit. 8, § 141(e).
124 Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1150.
125 See tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)-(2); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (1984).
126 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776
(2002).
127 Id.
128 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1217.
129 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301(2) ("The audit committee.., in its capacity as
a committee . .. shall be directly responsible [for the audit process] .... ").
130 See tit. 8, § 141(e); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c)-(e) (1984).
131 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1218.
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dictate that audit committee members must fulfill these responsibilities in
accordance with the duty of care. 132 However, SEC regulations promul-
gated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require directors to manage a system
of internal controls that provide "reasonable assurance regarding the reli-
ability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial state-
ments." 133 The liability standard articulated in the regulations does not
equate to the liability standards set forth under the duty of care, which
raises ambiguity concerning the extent to which the regulations promul-
gated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act preempt the duty of care.
C. Preemption Doctrine
The preemption doctrine dictates when federal statutes displace
state law.134 Consequently, preemption represents a significant form of
federalism, as it sways the structural balance of power within the frame-
work of dual sovereignty set forth in the Constitution. 135 The preemp-
tion doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause, 136 which provides that
"the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land."'137 This Constitutional provision does not, however, empower
Congress to enact preemptive legislation.' 38 The Supremacy Clause only
prescribes the result when state and federal laws conflict. 139 The author-
ity to enact preemptive statutes lies within the legislative powers granted
to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.14 0 As a result,
preemption decisions generally turn on issues of statutory construction-
132 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 93, § 4.01.
133 Management's Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8,238, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,921
(June 8, 2003).
134 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1, at 374
(7th ed. 2004).
135 See JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGIsLA-
TION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 1 (2006).
136 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982); CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A REFERENCE
GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94 (Jack Stark ed. 2004). But see Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 769 (1994) (arguing the
minority position that preemption doctrine "has little if anything to do with the Supremacy
Clause").
137 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
138 See id.; see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,
2088-91 (2000).
139 See Dinh, supra note 138, at 2090.
140 See id. at 2091 ("Preemption is not a substantive power of Congress, but rather a
method of regulation in furtherance of some other substantive congressional authority. The
power to preempt, therefore, is necessarily pendant on some enumerated power to regulate
under Article I, Section 8." (footnote omitted)).
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courts must determine when federal statutes and state law actually con-
flict within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause.'
41
The Supreme Court adopted a categorical approach to determine
whether federal statutes and state law conflict within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. 142 First, courts will find express preemption when
Congress "explicitly define[s] the extent to which its enactments pre-
empt state law."'143 Congress often communicates its intent to preempt
state law by adding explicit preemption clauses to federal legislation.
44
Second, even if federal legislation fails to evidence explicit Congres-
sional intent, courts may find implied preemption. 145 Congress can pre-
clude a finding of implied preemption by adding a preemption savings
clause or an anti-preemption clause to federal legislation.
146
Implied preemption arises in two forms: field preemption and con-
flict preemption. 147 Field preemption of all state law pertaining to a par-
ticular subject occurs if Congress intended a piece of federal legislation
to "occupy the field" with respect to that subject.' 48 When determining
the existence of field preemption, courts will consider any statement of
Congressional intent to occupy a field. 149 Courts then evaluate whether
the federal government maintains a dominant interest in occupying that
field. 150 Finally, courts consider whether the pervasiveness of federal
regulation in the field evidences Congressional intent to occupy it. 151
Conflict preemption arises in two instances. First, it occurs when adher-
ence to state law completely prohibits compliance with federal require-
ments. 152 Second, it occurs when adherence to state law impedes
achievement of the Congressional objective behind a piece of legisla-
tion. 153 The outcome of judicial decisions involving conflict preemption
generally turns on how broadly or narrowly a court construes those Con-
gressional objectives underlying a federal statute.' 5 4
When employing the categorical approach, courts apply a presump-
tion against preemption in areas "which the States have traditionally oc-
141 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 136, at 94; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 134,
§ 9.1, at 374.
142 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); see also DRAHOZAL, supra
note 136, at 95-96.
143 English, 496 U.S. at 78.
144 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 136, at 97.
145 See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
146 See O'REILLY, supra note 135, at 18-19.
147 See English, 496 U.S. at 79.
148 See id.
149 See O'RELLY, supra note 135, at 70.
150 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
151 See id.
152 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
153 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
154 See O'REILLY, supra note 135, at 75-76.
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cupied."' 55 Once applied, the presumption requires a stronger showing
before there can be any finding of preemption. 56 While courts typically
apply the presumption with respect to state police powers, 57 they often
apply it in other areas as well. 158 The presumption is more likely to
apply if a finding of preemption would preclude recovery by potential
plaintiffs. 1 59
The categorical approach also applies when determining whether
federal administrative regulations and state law conflict within the mean-
ing of the Supremacy Clause. 160 Administrative regulations adopted
under statutory delegations of authority may displace state law in the
same manner as Congressional legislation. 161 An administrative agency,
however, can only preempt state law to the extent minimally necessary to
achieve the goals of those statutes pursuant to which it enacts
regulations. 1
62
D. Analysis: Sarbanes-Oxley, Fiduciary Duties, and the Audit
Committee
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not contain a provision that explicitly
defines the extent to which it preempts state corporate law. 163 As a re-
sult, the interplay between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and state corporate
law involves issues of implied preemption. 164 Since the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and related SEC regulations evidence no intention "to occupy the
field" traditionally governed under state corporate law, implied field pre-
emption seems unlikely. 165 Moreover, courts must apply a strong pre-
155 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
156 See id.; see also DRAHOZAL, supra note 136, at 111.
157 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 136, at 112.
158 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (applying the
presumption against preemption to laws regulating advertising); California v. ARC Am. Co.,
490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (applying the presumption against preemption to laws regulating
monopolies and cartels).
159 See O'REILLY, supra note 135, at 7-8.
160 See id. at 14.
161 See id.
162 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000).
163 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see also
Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1209.
164 See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982).
165 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). The legislative history of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains no evidence suggesting that Congress wished to completely
usurp any area of state corporate law. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1210. SEC
administrative regulations have similarly demonstrated respect for various areas of state corpo-
rate law. See Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Securities Act Release No. 8,177A, Exchange Act Release No. 47,235A, 68 Fed. Reg.
5,110 (Jan. 31, 2003) ("[With respect to determining who qualifies as an audit committee
financial expert,] we think that it is appropriate that any such determination will be subject to
relevant state law principles such as the business judgment rule.").
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sumption against field preemption 166 because "[n]o principle of
corporat[e] law and practice is more firmly established than a State's
authority to regulate [its] domestic corporations."'167 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act thus preempts state corporate law only to the extent that con-
flicts exist. 
168
Despite any tension between Section 301 and state corporate stat-
utes, the ability to form an audit committee remains an independent
power of the board-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not independently
create audit committees within public corporations.' 69 Only a partial
conflict exists between Section 301, which requires public corporations
to establish an audit committee, 170 and state statutes that permit corporate
boards to create committees composed of one or more directors.171 Sec-
tion 301 merely directs boards how to exercise the option to create a
committee in one highly-specific context. As a result, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act only preempts state law to the extent it denies boards the op-
tion to forgo creation of an audit committee under the authority of state
corporate law. Despite the language of Section 301, the audit committee
remains a committee that is "established by . . . the board of
directors." 72
Furthermore, Section 301 fails to relieve directors who are not audit
committee members of their fiduciary duties with respect to financial
reporting. Section 301 indeed conveys direct responsibility upon the au-
dit committee for establishment of reporting systems with respect to ac-
counting concerns as well as the "appointment, compensation and
oversight" of all auditors. 173 Nevertheless, the audit committee remains
a committee of the board by definition. 174 Since delegating authority to a
commrtittee fails to relieve the remaining directors from any of their fidu-
ciary duties, 175 directors who are not audit committee members must still
fulfill their fiduciary duties with respect to financial reporting.' 76 No
conflict exists between the relevant state and federal provisions.
While Section 301 confers responsibility with respect to financial
reporting on the audit committee as a whole, state corporate law still
166 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
167 CTS Co. v. Dynamics Co., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
168 See English, 496 U.S. at 79.
169 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1217.
170 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776
(2002).
171 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)-(2) (2007); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.25(a)
(1984).
172 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(3).
173 Id. § 301.
174 See id. § 2(a)(3).
175 See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 8.25(f) (1984).
176 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1217.
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protects individual members when the committee takes action in good
faith reliance upon its financial expert. Section 301 indeed confers re-
sponsibilities upon the audit committee as a whole.'7 7 Once again, how-
ever, the audit committee remains a committee of the board by
definition.1 78 Since state corporate law protects committee members
who rely upon one another in good faith, 179 audit committee members
who act in good faith reliance upon the committee's financial expert re-
main insulated from liability under their fiduciary duties. 180 No conflict
exists between the relevant state and federal provisions. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act dictates that audit committee members must fulfill their re-
sponsibilities as a group, but state corporate law determines how fiduci-
ary duties apply to the process of reaching a consensus.
Finally, SEC regulations promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act have only a limited preemptory effect on the liability standards set
forth by audit committee members' fiduciary duty of care. Any audit
committee member who knowingly violates a provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act or its associated regulations will face liability under the duty
of care, as knowing violations of positive law constitute a breach of the
duty. 181 Nevertheless, SEC regulations require directors to manage a
system of internal financial controls that provide "reasonable assurance
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of fi-
nancial statements."182 While commentators have suggested that the lia-
bility standard set forth in these regulations may preempt directors'
fiduciary duty of care with respect to the oversight function, 183 such a
conclusion is technically incorrect. The duty of care requires that direc-
tors respond appropriately to any red flags that reasonable oversight
would uncover. 184 Although reasonable oversight under the duty of care
necessitates the implementation of internal controls, the sophistication of
those controls traditionally remains a matter of business judgment.
185
The SEC regulations, however, speak only to the sophistication of inter-
177 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301(2) ("The audit committee... in its capacity as a com-
mittee ... shall be directly responsible [for the audit process] ....").
178 See id. § 2(a)(3).
179 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2007); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(c)-(e)
(1984).
180 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1218.
181 See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26, at 291-92.
182 Management's Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8,238, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,921
(June 8, 2003).
183 See Johnson & Sides, supra note 35, at 1216.
184 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963) ("[D]irectors are
entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put
them on suspicion that something is wrong.").
185 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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nal controls and not the overall liability standard applied to directors
when monitoring corporate affairs. Thus, the SEC regulations actually
conflict with the business judgment rule in a very specific situation-
when directors implement internal controls as part of their oversight
responsibilities.
In light of the SEC regulations, audit committee members-like all
directors-must still exercise the reasonable oversight required under the
duty of care, which continues to necessitate the implementation of inter-
nal controls. The sophistication of those controls, however, is no longer
a matter of business judgment. The SEC regulations preempt the busi-
ness judgment rule in this narrow context. As a result, audit committee
members formulating internal control provisions pursuant to delegated
authority must adopt measures with a sophistication level that reasonably
assures the accuracy of financial reports. Decisions concerning control
sophistication no longer receive business judgment rule protection.
III. AUDIT COMMITTEE LIABILITY: FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A. Federal Securities Legislation
All corporate directors face potential liability under federal securi-
ties legislation. Currently, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 86
and the Exchange Act 187 serve as the principle sources of most federal
regulation in the securities industry. 188 While the Securities Act governs
all initial sales of securities, 189 the Exchange Act governs subsequent
securities trading in secondary markets. 190 The central purpose of both
acts, however, is to ensure that public corporations accurately disclose
sufficient information for current and potential shareholders to make in-
formed decisions. 191 As a result, federal securities law remains particu-
larly applicable to audit committee members, whose responsibilities
include the review of financial statements that represent the primary form
of communication with shareholders. 192
The most significant source of potential audit committee liability
under the Securities Act stems from Section 11. 193 Prior to effecting any
public securities offering through interstate commerce, corporations must
186 See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
187 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
188 See generally MARc I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 1 (2d ed. 1996).
189 See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933); see also STEINBERG, supra note 188, at
1.
190 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934); see also STEINBERG,
supra note 188, at 1.
191 See STEINBERG, supra note 188, at 1-2.
192 See HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING, supra note 27, at 5-3.
193 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11.
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file a registration statement with the SEC 194 that discloses certain infor-
mation to potential investors-including financial data.195 If the regis-
tration statement contains material misstatements or omissions, Section
11 permits those who purchased securities in the initial offering to sue
the issuer's board of directors for all related losses.1 96 The directors may
also face criminal charges if they willfully allowed the material misstate-
ments or omissions to occur.
97
While investors may sue the board collectively, courts apportion
any civil liability according to the responsibility of each individual direc-
tor.198 As a result, audit committee members remain especially vulnera-
ble to Section 11 claims resulting from inaccurate financial statements.
However, directors defending a Section 11 claim may assert several af-
firmative defenses. Specifically, evidence that a plaintiff securities pur-
chaser possessed knowledge of the relevant misstatements or omissions
at the time of sale will defeat a Section 11 claim. 99 Individual directors
may also establish that they performed sufficient due diligence to negate
any responsibility for the misstatements or omissions.2° °
The most significant source of potential audit committee liability
under the Exchange Act stems from Section 10(b)2 0 1-the general secur-
ities fraud prohibition. 20 2 Section 10(b) empowers the SEC to promul-
194 See id. § 5.
195 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.404(a) (2008).
196 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a). Section 11 plaintiffs generally need not prove
reliance on registration misstatements or omissions. See STEINBERG, supra note 188, at 148.
But see id. (noting that Section 11 claimants must demonstrate reliance if they purchased the
securities in question "more than 12 months after the effective date of the registration state-
ment and if the issuer has made generally available an earnings statement covering this 12-
month period.") (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 1 1(a)). Additionally, Section 11 plaintiffs
need not demonstrate registration misstatements or omissions actually caused the loss in ques-
tion. See STEINBERG, supra note 188, at 148.
197 See Securities Act of 1933 § 24. Section 24 of the 1933 Act makes a willful violation
of any provision in the 1933 Act a federal crime punishable by up to five years in prison and
$5,000 in fines. See id.
198 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737, 758 (1995).
199 See id.
200 See Securities Act of 1933 § lI(b)(3). With respect to any misstatement or omission
in a portion of the registration statement not based upon the opinion of an expert, defendant
directors who are not experts must demonstrate that after performing a reasonable investiga-
tion, they had reason to believe-and in fact did believe-there was no material misstatement
or omission. See id. With respect to any misstatement or omission in a portion of the registra-
tion statement based upon the opinion of an expert, defendant directors who are not experts
must demonstrate that they had no reasonable ground to believe-and in fact did not believe-
there was a material misstatement or omission. See id. If a portion of the registration state-
ment is based upon the opinion of directors who are experts, those directors must demonstrate
that after reasonable investigation, they had reason to believe-and in fact did believe-there
was no material misstatement or omission. See id.
201 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934).
202 See STEINBERG, supra note 188, at 181.
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gate rules prohibiting the use of "manipulative and deceptive device[s]"
designed to defraud investors "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange. '20 3 The SEC
thus promulgated Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 (Rule lOb-5), which prohib-
its individuals from employing any scheme or making any material mis-
statement or omission that perpetrates a fraud upon investors with respect
to the purchase or sale of securities.20 4 While the text of Section 10(b)
does not explicitly provide for a private right of action against individu-
als who commit securities fraud, the Supreme Court has established an
implied right of action that gives rise to civil liability.205 Furthermore,
acts of securities fraud committed in willful violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 give rise to criminal liability as well. 20 6
To succeed on a securities fraud claim based upon Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5, investors must establish the existence of a materially
false or misleading statement or an omission of fact connected with
transactions in which they either purchased or sold securities.20 7 Further-
more, investors must demonstrate that any directors named as defendants
permitted the material misstatement or omission with scienter-intent to
deceive.20 8 A majority of courts, however, will infer scienter upon a
showing that directors acted recklessly or were grossly negligent while
fulfilling their responsibilities. 209 This willingness to infer scienter par-
ticularly burdens the audit committee, as members may face liability for
recklessly failing to catch material misstatements or omissions generated
by others in the financial reporting process. Additionally, investors pur-
suing a securities fraud claim must demonstrate reasonable reliance on
the material misstatement or omission in question, but reliance on the
securities' market price at the time of sale is typically sufficient to meet
203 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §10(b).
204 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008). The sale or purchase must involve some channel
of interstate commerce, the mail, or a national securities exchange. See id. Transactions deal-
ing in the shares of a public corporation generally meet this requirement with ease. See STEIN-
BERG, supra note 188, at 182.
205 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The existence of
th[e] implied remedy [under Section 10(b)] is simply beyond peradventure.").
206 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b). Section 32 of the 1934 Act makes a
willful violation of any provision in the 1934 Act a federal crime punishable by up to two
years in prison and $10,000 in fines. See id. § 32.
207 See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988). A misstatement or omission of
fact is material if a reasonable individual would have considered the omitted information im-
portant in making an investment decision. See id. The purchase or sale must also involve the
channels of interstate commerce, the mail, or a national securities exchange-but this require-
ment is typically met when dealing with the securities of public corporations. See STEINBERG,
supra note 188, at 182.
208 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (finding scienter a necessary element for
a violation of Exchange Act Rule l0b-5).
209 STEINBERG, supra note 188, at 187.
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this burden.210 Finally, investors pursing a securities fraud claim must
establish that the material misstatement or omission caused them to suf-
fer an actual loss.
2 11
B. The Intrusion of Sarbanes-Oxley: Section 804 Statute of
Limitations
Section 804 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides a new statute of
limitations for all "private right[s] of action that involve[ ] a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regula-
tory requirement concerning the securities laws. '212 Commentators,
however, frequently criticize the language of Section 804 "as hastily
passed and 'poorly crafted"' because it creates interpretational difficul-
ties in defining the precise securities claims to which it refers.213 Despite
this lack of statutory precision, courts typically agree that the statute of
limitations set forth in Section 804 applies to all claims of securities
fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5, but it does not apply to Sec-
tion 11 claims. 214 The majority view reasons that the statutory language
does not refer to Section 11 claims-even if such claims sound in
fraud-because fraudulent intent is not an essential element of a claim
brought under Section 11.215
Section 804 now permits plaintiffs to bring claims of securities
fraud within two years of discovering the conduct that gave rise to the
cause of action or within five years of the date such conduct took
place.216 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act thus extended the previous, more re-
strictive statutory period, which forced plaintiffs to bring securities fraud
210 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (stating in plurality opinion that investors who rely on a
security's market price at the time of sale are presumed to reasonably rely on any material
misstatements or omissions for purpose of Rule lOb-5 actions); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 26,
at 698 (noting that lower courts follow the plurality holding in Basic even though it does not
constitute binding precedent on the Supreme Court).
211 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105(b),
109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995).
212 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804(b), 116 Stat. 745, 801
(2002).
213 In re Enron Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2004 WL 405886,
at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004) (quoting Bruce Vanyo, et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002: A Securities Litigation Perspective, 1332 PLI/CoRP. 89, 119-20 (2002)); see also
Michael A. Perino, Statute of Limitations Under the Newly Passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 2002, at 4 ("[The language of Section 804] is poorly drafted ... [and]
inconsistent with express statutes of limitation already contained in the federal securities laws
and is likely to create significant interpretational difficulties for courts.").
214 See In re Enron, 2004 WL 405886 at *12; In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 431, 439-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec.
Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Friedman v. Rayovac Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d
957, 978-79 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
215 See In re Enron, 2004 WL 405886 at *12.
216 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(a).
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claims within one year of discovering the conduct that gave rise to the
cause of action and within three years of the date such conduct took
place.217 Specifically, the longer statute of limitations prescribed in Sec-
tion 804 applies "to all [securities fraud] proceedings ... that are com-
menced on or after the date of enactment of [the Sarbanes-Oxley]
Act.",218
The statutory language implementing the extended limitations pe-
riod gives rise to interesting questions regarding retroactive effect. By its
own terms, Section 804 seems to revive securities fraud claims that had
already expired by the time Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
but which still fall within the extended statute of limitations. This out-
come is especially perplexing given the final clause in Section 804(c)
prescribing that the extended statute of limitations "shall create [no] new,
private right of action.
'219
C. Retroactivity Doctrine
Traditionally, Anglo-American law has viewed with hostility those
legislative endeavors that seek to impose liability on actions that have
already taken place.220 Courts typically adhere to the maxim that "where
no law is, there can be no transgression" despite the enactment of post
hoc legislation imposing civil or criminal liability.22 Moreover, the dis-
favor with which courts view laws that seek to impose liability on past
conduct speaks to the very legitimacy of our legal system, as "[t]he na-
ture of the rule of law is to substitute rules announced in advance for the
[post hoc vigilante] judgment of men."'222 Three arguments support a
cautious treatment of such legislation. First, fundamental fairness and
the establishment of social order necessitate reliance upon current
law 23-individual actors often evaluate the legal ramifications of a par-
ticular course before taking any action. Second, the power to impose
liability post hoc increases the ability of the political majority to discrim-
inate against unpopular groups within the political minority.224 Bias, for
example, may tempt lawmakers looking backward to enact discrimina-
tory legislation because "[a] law for the future is impersonal; whereas a
217 See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2007).
218 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(b).
219 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804(c).
220 See, e.g., DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACIVE LEGISLATON 1 (1998); Elmer E. Smead, The
Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisdiction, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775,
775 (1936).
221 See Romans 5:13 ("[Sin is not imputed when there is no law.").
222 TROY, supra note 220, at 19.
223 See W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive
Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 222 (1960).
224 See TROY, supra note 220, at 19.
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law for the past may be personal. '225 Third, widespread adoption of
backward-operating legislation results in an inefficient allocation of eco-
nomic resources, 226 as uncertainty stemming from the legal system pro-
vides a powerful incentive for firms to under-invest.
227
Hostility to legislation that disrupts prior reliance on the law lives in
several sections of the Constitution. Article I, Section IX provides that
Congress shall pass "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law. '228 In
addition, Article I, Section X prescribes that "[n]o state shall ... pass any
ex post facto Law."'229 These provisions prevent the federal and state
governments from enacting legislation that criminalizes conduct that has
already occurred.230 Additionally, the Contracts Clause prevents the pas-
sage of any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts" already in
force,231 and the Takings Clause prescribes that "private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' 232 The Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth233 and Fourteenth 234 Amendments also pre-
vent the federal and state governments from depriving any individual of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law." However, the
Takings and Due Process Clauses do not completely prohibit backward-
operating legislation.2 35 Both the state and federal governments thus re-
tain some flexibility under the Constitution to infringe upon expectations
crafted in reliance upon the law.
236
All laws displace the prior expectations of individuals to a certain
extent,237 as the implementation of most legislation depends upon ante-
cedent facts. 238 Lawmakers first observe conduct or circumstances con-
sidered sub-optimal from a societal perspective, and then enact
legislation that uses criminal or civil liability to alter behavior.239 At the
very least, individuals who act in reliance upon existing legal rules will
be surprised when those rules change.240 Legal change, however, be-
225 Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409, 417 (1928).
226 See TROY, supra note 220, at 20-21.
227 See Pablo T. Spiller, Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities' Privatiza-
tion, 2 IND. CORP. & CHANGE 387, 393 (1993) (documenting the adverse economic effects of
legal instability in developing countries).
228 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
229 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
230 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 365 (1798).
231 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
232 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
233 Id.
234 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
235 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 134, § 11.9, § 11.11.
236 See TROY, supra note 220, at 4.





comes necessary with the evolution of society. As a result, an appropri-
ate balance must be struck because "[i]f every time a man relied on
existing law in arranging his affairs, he were made secure against any
change in legal rules, the whole body of our law would be ossified
forever.",2
41
The retroactivity doctrine seeks to balance the need for legal change
with the importance of protecting legitimate expectations formulated in
reliance upon the law. The doctrine determines when legislation has a
sufficiently significant effect on past expectations to be deemed "retroac-
tive. '242 The doctrine then dictates which retroactive enactments are ille-
gitimate. 243 A retroactive statute "takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considera-
tions already past." 244 Thus, a retroactive statute changes the legal con-
sequences of conduct that has already taken place.245 Strong retroactive
legislation explicitly states that it applies only to conduct that took place
before the date of its enactment.246 Weak retroactive legislation operates
in a forward manner, but it also explicitly changes the legal conse-
quences of past behavior.2 47 Finally, implied retroactive legislation
makes no mention of past behavior but nonetheless changes the legal
consequences of actions that have already occurred. 2
48
Since "the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed
under the law that existed when the conduct took place,' 249 the Supreme
Court has adopted a presumption against retroactivity.250 The Court set
forth a two-prong test in Landgraf v. USI Film Products for determining
when federal statutes overcome the presumption and constitutionally op-
erate upon prior actions.25' First, courts must determine whether any
evidence exists that demonstrates explicit, unambiguous congressional
intent to apply the statute retroactively. 252 Such a determination requires
both an investigation of the statutory text and the relevant legislative his-
241 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY o LAW 60 (1964).
242 See TROY, supra note 220, at 2-3.
243 See id.
244 Landgraf v. USE Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) (quoting Soc'y for Propa-
gation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (1814) (Story, J.)).
245 See TROY, supra note 220, at 6.
246 See Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 383 (1977).
247 See TROY, supra note 220, at 6.
248 See id. at 7.
249 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
250 See id. at 265 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 494 U.S. at 855 (discussing
Supreme Court decisions evidencing a strong presumption against retroactivity)).
251 See id. at 268.
252 See id.
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tory.25 3 Provided the enactment is otherwise constitutional, courts must
comply with explicit, unambiguous congressional intent to retroactively
apply legislation. 254 Second, in the absence of explicit, unambiguous
congressional intent, courts must determine whether the legislation in
question sufficiently disrupts past expectations such that it has "retroac-
tive effect. '255 If the legislation operates retroactively in the absence of
congressional intent, it must be struck down. 256
D. Current Interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 804
1. In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. Securities
Litigation
In Enterprise, the Second Circuit articulated the majority position
with respect to the impact of Section 804 on stale securities fraud
claims. 257 The plaintiffs asserted securities fraud claims under Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 that were time-barred under the applicable statute
of limitations in place before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
but which fell within the longer window set forth in Section 804.258 The
district court dismissed the case on the ground that Section 804 does not
revive stale claims. 259 On appeal, the Second Circuit applied the Su-
preme Court's two-prong retroactivity test from Landgraf.
260
Under the first prong of the Landgraf test, courts must comply with
any explicit, unambiguous congressional intent to apply a statute retroac-
tively. 261 Judge Cabranes began the inquiry with an evaluation of the
Section 804(b) language stating that the longer statute of limitations
"shall apply to all [securities fraud] proceedings.., that are commenced
on or after the date of enactment of [the Sarbanes-Oxley] Act."' 262 The
plaintiffs argued that this language demonstrates clear intent to apply the
longer statute of limitations in all securities fraud claims brought after
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-regardless of whether the
253 See id.
254 See id. at 280.
255 See id.
256 See id.
257 See In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir.
2005). The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits subsequently concurred with the
Enterprise analysis. See Margolies v. Deason, 464 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2006); Lieberman
v. Cambridge Partners L.L.C., 432 F.3d 482, 484 (3d Cir. 2006); In re ADC Telecomm., Inc.
Sec. Litig., 409 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2005); Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., No. 03-2188,
2005 WL 647745, at *4 (4th Cir. 2005); Foss v. Bear, 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 2005).
258 See Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 404.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 405-10.
261 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268.
262 Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 406.
THE AUDIT COMMITrEE
claims were previously time-barred. 263 Judge Cabranes opined, how-
ever, that although Section 804(b) is "most naturally read" according to
the plaintiffs' interpretation, the language is in fact ambiguous with re-
spect to congressional intent.264 First, he noted that Section 804(b) does
not contain the exact language the Supreme Court determined would
constitute unambiguous evidence of intent in Landgraf265 Moreover,
Judge Cabranes pointed to the Section 804(c) language stating that
"[n]othing in this section shall create a new, private right of action.
'266
He reasoned that empowering a plaintiff to bring a claim that was previ-
ously time-barred-and thus had no legal basis-could reasonably be
construed as creating a new cause of action.267 Since the explicit lan-
guage of Section 804 was ambiguous, it failed the first prong of the Lan-
dgraf test. 2
68
The second prong of the Landgraf test dictates that in the absence of
explicit evidence of congressional intent, courts must strike down legisla-
tion to the extent it operates retroactively. 269 Judge Cabranes reasoned
that extending a statute of limitations post hoc sufficiently disrupts ex-
pectations so as to generate a retroactive effect because it 'increase[s] [a
defendant's] liability for past conduct.' 270 Extending a statute of limita-
tions to revive stale claims increases the amount of time during which
potential defendants may face suit and deprives them of an affirmative
defense upon which they may have reasonably relied.
271
2. Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, the Eleventh Circuit articulated the minor-
ity position with respect to the impact of Section 804 on stale claims.
272
The plaintiffs asserted securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 that were time-barred under the applicable statute of limita-
tions in place before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act but which
263 See id. at 406.
264 See id. at 406-07.
265 See id. at 406. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court determined that the language "all
proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment" provided unambiguously
explicit evidence of Congress's intent regarding retroactive application. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
255-56 n.8. Section 804 does not include the phrase "pending on" as used in Landgraf. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 804, 116 Stat. 745, 801 (2002)
266 Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 407.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
270 Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).
271 See id.
272 See Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). The
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have each adopted the opposing
position. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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fell within the longer window set forth in Section 804.273 On interlocu-
tory appeal from the district court, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Su-
preme Court's two-prong retroactivity test from Landgraf.
2 74
Under the first prong of the Landgraf test, the court began with an
evaluation of the Section 804(b) language stating that the longer statute
of limitations "shall apply to all [securities fraud] proceedings . . .that
are commenced on or after the date of enactment of ... [the Sarbanes-
Oxley] Act."'275 Unlike Judge Cabranes in Enterprise, Judge Birch of the
Eleventh Circuit looked only to the most reasonable interpretation of the
text, which suggests a retroactive application. 276 He reasoned that be-
cause the longer statute of limitations applies to all securities fraud
claims brought after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it neces-
sarily applies to claims that were previously time-barred.2 77 Judge Birch
gave no weight to the Section 804(c) language stating that the extended
statute of limitations fails to create new private rights of action.2 78 As a
result, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Section 804 text evidenced ex-
plicit, unambiguous congressional intent to apply the longer statute of
limitations retroactively.2 79 Since the first prong of the Landgraf test
was met, the analysis ended and the court applied the extended statute of
limitations retroactively.
280
E. Analysis: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 804 Interpretations
The Eleventh Circuit erred in failing to consider the language of
Section 804(c) under the first prong of the Landgraf test. While Judge
Birch correctly concluded the most reasonable interpretation of Section
804(b) suggests application of the longer statute of limitations to previ-
ously time-barred claims, the first prong of the Landgraf test requires
"unambiguous" evidence of congressional intent28 1-not evidence of a
statute's most reasonable interpretation. The intent of Congress may re-
main ambiguous with respect to a piece of legislation even if most rea-
sonable individuals would interpret the statutory language in a certain
way.28 2 Since Section 804(c) provides that the extended statute of limi-
273 See Dean Witter Reynolds, 410 F.3d at 1277.
274 See id. at 1278, 1281-83.
275 Id. at 1279.
276 See id. at 1279-83.
277 See id. at 1279, 1282.
278 See id. at 1279-83.
279 See id. at 1281-82.
280 See id.
281 Landgraf v. USE Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994).
282 See In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir.
2005).
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tations does not give rise to any new private rights of action, 283 the text
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act leaves some doubt as to whether Congress
intended the new limitations period to revive securities fraud claims that
were previously time-barred.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the SEC's amicus brief,284 the
Second Circuit failed to sufficiently consider the legislative history of
Section 804 under the first prong of the Landgraf test. Judge Cabranes
noted that nothing in the legislative history "indicates that the extension
of the statute of limitations was intended to revive expired claims or that
Congress was even considering such a thing. '28 5 Senator Patrick Leahy,
however, specifically introduced Section 804 because the prior statute of
limitations prevented certain Enron investors from pursuing securities
fraud claims against the corporation and its directors. 286 As such, Con-
gress extended the statute of limitations for securities fraud to provide
victims of then recently discovered accounting scandals with a means of
bringing judicial actions that were time-barred under existing law. 287
Section 804 therefore "applies to any and all cases filed after the effec-
tive date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct oc-
curred. '288 Furthermore, Section 804(c) merely serves to clarify that the
extended statute of limitations only applies to "already existing private
causes of action under the various federal securities laws that have been
held to support private causes of action. ' 28 9 Section 804(c) does not
speak to retroactivity, as it simply dictates the type of claim in which
plaintiffs may invoke the extended limitations period. 290 Since Section
283 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-294, § 804(c), 116 Stat. 745, 801
(2002).
284 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, AIG Asian Infrastructure Fund, L.P. v. Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd., No. 04-2403,
2005 WL 435406 (2005). The SEC first proffered the legislative history argument for Section
804's retroactive application in an amicus brief prior to AIG Asian Infrastructure Fund, L.P. v.
Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd. See id. The court in Enterprise took judicial notice of this amicus
brief, but it imprudently dismissed the SEC's superior argument because the agency lacked
legal authority to enforce its position. See Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 410 n.8.
285 Enterprise, 391 F.3d at 408.
286 See 148 CONG. REc. S1785-86 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
287 See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. S6524-02, S6534 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("We
already have a very short statute of limitations in here anyway. We ought to at least have [it
so] that ... people might be able to recover some of the money they have lost .... There
ought to be some way for the people who lost their pension, lost their li[f]e savings, to get it
back."); id. at S6540-41 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[We see WorldCom and Tyco and
Xerox, and we say ... let's do everything we can to let the people defrauded by them recover
some of their ill-gotten gains."); 148 CONG. REc. H4683-01, H4692 (2002) (statement of Rep.
Markey) ("We are only finding out right now about fraud from 2 or 3 years ago. We need to
stretch out the statute of limitations so [the victims] can sue.").
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804 passes the first prong of the Landgraf test, courts should end the
analysis and apply the extended statute of limitations retroactively.
291
Nevertheless, even if a court proceeds to the second prong of the
Landgraf test, several important issues still arise. Judge Cabranes cor-
rectly reasoned that extending a statute of limitations to revive stale
claims deprives defendants of an affirmative defense upon which they
may have reasonably relied. 292 As a result, interpreting Section 804 to
revive previously time-barred securities fraud claims seems to unfairly
disrupt prior expectations. The presumption against retroactive legisla-
tion, however, fundamentally assumes that individuals modify their be-
havior depending upon the current state of law. 293 It appears unlikely
that corporate managers evaluate the applicable statute of limitations for
securities fraud in deciding whether or not to engage in deceitful activity.
While directors and officers may consider the probability of being caught
perpetuating a fraud, it seems doubtful they reflect upon the length of
time during which aggrieved investors could bring suit. As a result, the
second prong of the Landgraf test may simply be inadequate to deal with
the retroactive application of Section 804.
F. Analysis: Sarbanes-Oxley, Federal Securities Legislation, and the
Audit Committee
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act affects the audit committee in a num-
ber of important ways, it fails to significantly alter the federal liability
standards that govern individual audit committee members. For exam-
ple, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act codifies the many specific duties of an audit
committee through amendment of the Exchange Act.294 Nevertheless, its
provisions fail to reach the liability standards set forth under Securities
Act Section 11 and Exchange Act Rule 1Ob-5. 295 Although Section 804
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extends the statute of limitations for securities
fraud, it fails to alter the standards by which courts in search of liability
review the conduct of directors. Thus, even if the Supreme Court inter-
venes to grant Section 804 retroactive effect, individual audit committee
members who served during the accounting scandals of the late 1990's
would not face more exacting scrutiny of their conduct.
Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act extends the criminal liability
standards set forth under federal securities legislation only to a limited
291 Landgraf v. USE Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
292 In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. Sec. Litig., 391 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir.
2005).
293 See TROy, supra note 220, at 18 ("The requirement that people be given notice of the
legal implications of their behavior assumes that .. . we are capable not only theoretically of
modifying our behavior depending on the rule of law, but that we do so in fact.").
294 See supra Part I.A.
295 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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extent. Section 802, for example, creates new criminal liability for the
destruction or alteration of documents with intent to hinder a federal in-
vestigation. 296 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also increases the criminal pen-
alty for certain white collar federal crimes 297-including securities
fraud.298 However, the federal securities laws have always prescribed
that any willful violation of their provisions constitutes a criminal of-
fense.299 Thus, while audit committee members may face greater expo-
sure to criminal liability because of the many responsibilities the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes upon them, courts still review individual
abdications of those responsibilities under the historical standard-only
willful abdications give rise to criminal liability.
CONCLUSION
In response to the accounting fraud that infiltrated U.S. capital mar-
kets at the dawn of the new millennium, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act im-
posed a set of responsibilities upon audit committees that dramatically
increased the burden of their membership. 30 0 The enactment, however,
fails to significantly heighten the liability standards governing audit com-
mittee members under both state corporate law and federal securities leg-
islation. 301 For example, perhaps the greatest increase in liability
exposure that audit committee members face stems from the potential for
willing or knowing abdications of the numerous responsibilities the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes upon them.302 However, the criminal lia-
bility associated with any willful abdication remains a traditional aspect
of federal securities legislation, 303 and the civil liability associated with
any knowing abdication remains a traditional aspect of state corporate
law. 3°4 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act thus increases liability exposure, but it
fails to significantly heighten the standards under which the law scruti-
nizes audit committee members' conduct.
While audit committee members may take some comfort in know-
ing "'liability [standards have] changed very little,'"305 they must still
remain cognizant that "'the emotional perception of liability has changed
a [great deal].' "306 Much of the public hostility towards corporate direc-
296 See id. § 802.
297 See id. Title IX.
298 See id. § 807.
299 See Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 48 Stat. 74, 87 (1933); Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, § 32, 48 Stat. 881, 904 (1934).
300 See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text and Part I.A.
301 See supra Part l.D and Part III.F.
302 See supra note 181 and accompanying text and Part IIIF.
303 See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
304 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
305 STUART, supra note 6, at 17.
306 Id.
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tors that arose in the wake of Enron's collapse has yet to dissipate. 30 7 As
a result, a given judge or jury might readily indulge the inclination to
stretch liability standards with respect to the audit committee-particu-
larly when a case involves financial misstatements or omissions. Even
though the Sarbanes-Oxley Act fails to significantly alter the black letter
law articulating these standards, it seems that individual audit committee
members will have to continue "'walking a fine line between "reasona-
ble care" and "unreasonable worry"' " well into the foreseeable future.30 8
307 See id.
308 Id. at 16.
